Well yeah, the keyfiles set to be deleted by some sort of dead man's switch was specifically made to address situation #2. Keyfiles gone = can't get in no matter what.
Something like the keyfiles being stored on some device set up with a script that will delete the keyfiles if the device holding the containers leaves some sort of geographical boundary.
Part of the idea with encryption though is to make sure it doesn't look like encryption and that you have a reasonable alibi for why there is a bunch of random data. A properly fully encrypted disk will just look like some disk that has been shredded using a data shredding algorithm or some stress stesting application that writes randomly generated data to a disk until you tell it to stop.
Then you can just be like "Oh those are just spare disks in case the RAID disks in my FreeNAS over there go out. I did some stress testing on them when I got them that involved writing a shit ton of random data to them for a few days straight so that I could trust them if I ever needed to use them."
That way if situation 2 occurs, your alibi is that they aren't actually encrypted, and if for some reasons they don't believe you then that is where the hidden volumes come into play, the volume actually has two passwords. One will access the full size of the container, and in there you'll stick some sensitive looking documents like stuff containing social security numbers, perhaps a notepad or database of "just in case I forget" password to some website that you don't care if someone gains access to, and perhaps some bank account numbers. Then the other password can be used to unlock a smaller area of the encrypted container that contains the real private informations. So you reach situation 2 and you unlock it for them before they hit you with the 5 dollar wrench.